Idk how proactive patching an exploited-in-the-wild unauth RCE is, but pr statements gonna pr i guess.
>This [...] vuln is not a breach or compromise of MongoDB
IANAL, but this seems like a pretty strong stance to take? Who exactly are you blaming here?
>vulnerability was discovered internally
>detected the issue
Interesting choice of words. I wonder if their SIEM/SOC discovered a compromise, or if someone detected a tweet.
>December 12–14 – We worked continuously
It took 72 clock hours, assumably hundreds of man hours, to fix a malloc use after free and cstring null term bug? Maybe the user input field length part was a major design point??
>dec 12 "detect" the issue, dec 19 cve, dec 23 first post
Boy this sure seems like a long time for a first communication for a guaranteed compromise if internet facing bug.
Not sure there's a security tool in the world that would stop data exfiltration via protocol error logs.
Might not be how it appears. The CVE number can be reserved by the org and then "published" with only minimal info, then later update with full details. Looking at the meta data that's probably what happened here (not entirely sure what the update was though):
That's a good question. I suppose that posting the commit makes it incredibly obvious how to exploit the issue, so maybe they wanted to wait a little bit longer for their on-prem users who were slow to patch?
listen, I'm not saying the venn diagram between people who use mongo and people who would open it to the internet is a circle, but there is... ahem... a big overlap
Idk how proactive patching an exploited-in-the-wild unauth RCE is, but pr statements gonna pr i guess.
>This [...] vuln is not a breach or compromise of MongoDB
IANAL, but this seems like a pretty strong stance to take? Who exactly are you blaming here?
>vulnerability was discovered internally >detected the issue
Interesting choice of words. I wonder if their SIEM/SOC discovered a compromise, or if someone detected a tweet.
>December 12–14 – We worked continuously
It took 72 clock hours, assumably hundreds of man hours, to fix a malloc use after free and cstring null term bug? Maybe the user input field length part was a major design point??
>dec 12 "detect" the issue, dec 19 cve, dec 23 first post
Boy this sure seems like a long time for a first communication for a guaranteed compromise if internet facing bug.
Not sure there's a security tool in the world that would stop data exfiltration via protocol error logs.
Seriously.
Mongo?
Reference: https://bigdata.2minutestreaming.com/p/mongobleed-explained-...